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Introduction
In the IT sector, most organisations implement security standards to be competitive and trustworthy parties that run highly integrated and secure businesses [1] . However, despite regulations, law and awareness of security measures, data breaches continue to grow and evolve. For instance, according to recent surveys, by around 84% of UK organisations suffered at least one data breach in 2007 [2] .
When an organisation performs regular risk assessments of assets and services, the risk of experiencing a data breach may decrease. However, frequently, decisions on what security measures should be implemented are made based on the personal experience of the decision maker, who is often unaware of specific system weaknesses and new threats. In order to solve this issue, researchers have proposed a number of models relating to qualitative and quantitative risk assessment approaches, where attack trees and attack graphs are used to estimate the shortest attack paths and related security costs [3, 4, 5, 6, 7] . However, these models lack of practical sense and cannot support cost-effective security decisions.
A cost-effective and coherent risk assessment should study the relationships among system vulnerabilities, threats and countermeasures. Knowing potential risks gives the ability to organisations to make effective decisions on what security countermeasures should be implemented before any potential threat can successfully exploit system vulnerabilities. NIST SP800-30, ISO 27001 and ISO 17799 are common methodologies, which provide some guidelines on how risk should be assessed and how countermeasures should be selected [8, 9, 10] . However, these guidelines do not provide a specific method for assessing risk related factors, i.e., vulnerabilities, threats, and addressing them via security countermeasures.
Security countermeasure selection problems have received a great deal of attention in the recent literature [11, 12, 13, 1] . However, existing approaches deal with this problem from very different perspectives. The authors in [12] analyse the countermeasure selection in relation to residual vulnerabilities, which are represented as uncovered existing vulnerabilities.
The idea behind their approach is to maximise the coverage of existing vulnerabilities by implementing the selected set of countermeasures, thus, to minimise the residual vulnerability (uncovered). Another approach to select a portfolio of countermeasures in relation to investment costs is by analysing the residual damage in the system if a system hole is not fixed [13] and considering a set of controls in a form of disabling, enabling or patching a service or application.
Although they are very detailed in some aspects, current countermeasure selection approaches miss some other details. For example, applying a countermeasure may eliminate some risks, but generate new ones under certain circumstances. Therefore, it is not enough performing risk assessments and independently selecting security countermeasures, but it is necessary to understand the bi-directional relationship between them both. In this way, we can make sure in a cost-effective manner that organisations are aware of possible data losses and that the adequate security countermeasures are in place.
Due to the lack of studies on this topic, this paper investigates risk assessment methodologies and provides a tool to select security countermeasures taking financial costs and residual risks into account. More specifically, based on NIST SP800-30 guidelines, we propose a risk assessment and optimisation model (RAOM) to satisfy organisational security needs in a cost-effective manner, systematically present our security countermeasure selection problem and formulate it as a multi-objective optimisation problem, where variables such as financial cost and residual risks may affect the final solution. We also propose a tailored Tabu Search(TS)-based heuristic approach to solve the proposed multi-objective optimisation problem and asses the qualities of its solutions with respect to optimal ones.
Risk Assessment and Optimisation Model (RAOM)
In this section we present our risk assessment model, compare it to NIST SP800-30 framework and formally define our multi-objective optimisation problem.
ROAM consists of two processes, risk assessment and optimisation routine. The purpose of the proposed RAOM is to provide the foundation of an effective risk assessment procedure, containing practical methods necessary for assessing risks and cost-effectively minimising them through security countermeasures. Figure 1 illustrates the flow chart of RAOM, which describes firstly the risk assessment stages (Part A), including identification of risks through a vulnerability assessment, their impacts through the analysis of threats mapped onto vulnerabilities and secondly, optimisation routine (Part B), which is used to find optimal solutions in a cost-effective manner.
The first stage in our proposed risk assessment procedure is to identify essential organisation's systems and functions, which cannot be interrupted under any circumstances. Then, these systems and functions are assessed for vulnerabilities, because if there is a vulnerability in the network, there is the risk that a threat exploits the vulnerability, and hence the organisation may face unexpected technical damages and financial expenditures. Vulnerabilities, technical or nontechnical, can be identified in four ways: using automated vulnerability scanning tools, performing penetration tests on systems, using vulnerability modelling techniques and assessing previous risk assessment IT documentation. Once the vulnerabilities are characterised, it is important to identify the threats that can exploit them. Vulnerabilities can only be translated into risk if there is a threat able to exploit them. If we can estimate vulnerabilities and threats, we can derive the level of risk in an organisation. Our aim is then to reduce this level of risk by selecting the appropriate set of countermeasures in a cost-effective manner.
Definition of Vulnerabilities
Vulnerabilities are the weaknesses or flaws in system security procedures, design or internal controls that can be triggered or intentionally exploited, resulting in a security breach or a violation of security policy.
The National Vulnerability Database provides a source of technical vulnerabilities [14] . Every vulnerability may have a different impact level on a system.Traditionally, the impacts of a vulnerability on confidentiality, integrity and availability (CIA) are considered, where for each one of them, there are three impact levels: partial (P), complete (C) and none (N). The tuple comprised of the three potential impact levels on CIA of a vulnerability is then translated into an impact sub-score I sub with range [1, 10] , where 1 is the lowest and 10 is the highest impact. I sub can also be retrieved from the National Vulnerability Database [14] , and depends on the inherent characteristics of the vulnerability: exploit range, attack complexity, level of authentication needed. 
where V i represents an individual vulnerability. The value 1 indicates the presence of this vulnerability in the information systems, otherwise 0.
Moreover, as discussed before, impact on CIA sub-score I sub of vulnerability i is mapped onto impact I i as follows
M edium(50) when 4.0 ≤ I sub ≤ 6.9;
High(100) when 7.0 ≤ I sub ≤ 10;
Because every vulnerability identified in the network is a potential risk, we include all vulnerabilities into our analysis. For example, if we assume that an organisation has identified 10 vulnerabilities, we set n to 10 and V i = 1 ∀n.
Threat Analysis
The next step in the model is to perform a threat analysis, which consists of identifying potential threat sources and actions that may exploit system
vulnerabilities. An attack can be defined as the action, in which a threat exploits a vulnerability that may create some risk in the system.
Information about threats can be gathered from the organisation's historical data base about the attacks recorded in system log files or by using threat modelling techniques, which can predict threats not known to the organisation. For example, modelling techniques, such as attack graphs, attack trees or an onion skin model [15, 16] have been used to predict new threats in particular scenarios.
Let each threat be represented as a single bit in the threat vector:
where T j represents an individual threat. The value 1 indicates the presence of this threat in the information systems and otherwise 0.
Thereafter, based on data breaches reports, logged attack attempts and self-expertise, we can match threats to vulnerabilities ( 
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Arbitrary code execution the likelihood L ij of a threat T j acting over a vulnerability V i , as shown in Table 3 , i.e., L ij = V i , T j [17, 18, 19] .
This likelihood can adopt three values: 0.1, 0.5 and 1, where the value 0.1 represents low likelihood of threat T j exploiting vulnerability V i , 0.5medium likelihood and 1 -high likelihood. If a threat T j has no effect on a vulnerability V i , there is no risk and we make L ij = 0.
Risk Level Analysis
Definition 1: Total Initial Risk (TIR) is the sum of initial risks in an organisation, when no security countermeasure has been applied, and can be computed as follows 
where T IR ∈ R + ;
Once T IR is known, the organisation becomes aware of how critical identified vulnerabilities are for running a successful business. Thus, the next step is to identify potential security countermeasures that can be applied to reduce the T IR value.
Control Recommendation
In general, security countermeasures (Table 4 ) can be categorised as technical, management and operational based on the function they provide.
Similar classification can be found in the NIST report [8] . Let each countermeasure be represented as a single bit in the countermeasure vector:
where S l represents an individual countermeasure. The value 1 indicates that this countermeasure is applied to the information system and otherwise 0.
The selection of countermeasures is performed by first matching them to identified vulnerabilities as shown in Table 5 . In particular, we assign z li based on the characteristics of a certain vulnerability and a countermeasure, and realistically assign the matching values for certain combinations based on its applicability. Previously countermeasure-to-vulnerability matching idea has been proposed in [20] .
Information in Table 5 has been mostly retrieved from NIST vulnerability database [14] , where general information about vulnerabilities as well as countermeasures from a number of vendors can be found. Furthermore, we have relied on data breach reports [14, 21, 22] and our own knowledge to deliver the concise data about what vulnerabilities can be created or addressed while an appropriate countermeasure is implemented.
Each countermeasure-vulnerability combination z li may have one of the five possible consequences:
Note that if it is properly selected, a countermeasure can address a vulnerability, but if it is not adequately chosen may generate a new one. This fact penalises organisations that do not judiciously select countermeasures.
Each of these countermeasures has an associated cost C l . In this study, 
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The overall cost for a particular security countermeasure S l is the sum of the four presented sub-costs defined in monetary units (Eq.5).
The cost values estimated for each of the countermeasures used in our analysis are shown in Table 6 . The values have been estimated relying on the costs offered by the security technology manufacturers and self expertise. way of quantifying risks in relation to threats and vulnerabilities. From the literature, researchers agree that security is commonly referred to as confidentiality, integrity and availability (CIA) [23] . In fact, a vulnerability will impact CIA, if it is exploited and it will cause disruptions in delivering services to customers, so CIA plays a crucial role in estimating total risks.
Thus, the proposed approach allows to perform a more realistic vulnerability assessment and thus, to calculate the total risk value an organisation holds considering the impact on security triangle.
RAOM also includes a control selection method, which incorporates a multi-objective function and an optimisation technique (Figure 1,Part B) .
The multi-objective function is proposed considering two conflicting factors:
cost and risk to be optimised. As a result, an optimisation routine can provide with the solutions (trade-offs) that can satisfy organisational security needs in a cost-effective manner.
Problem Formulation
We consider two objectives in this study: the total investment cost T C and the risk R. For the n = 10 vulnerabilities listed in Table 1 we have suggested l = 24 generic security countermeasures ( Table 4 ). As a result, the 2 24 security countermeasures choices available prove the problem to be hard to solve manually or relying on self-expertise. Furthermore, the time to find the solution increases when the size of the problem increases, i.e., if the number of vulnerabilities n, threats m and countermeasures k increases, the time to find the optimal solution also increases.
Definition 2: Total investment cost
Given a set of k security measures, each having a cost C l , 1 ≤ l ≤ k and having a vector of S = (S l ), S l ∈ {0, 1}∀ l, 1 ≤ l ≤ k, the total investment cost T C is defined as:
S l =    1 if a security measure l is selected in the solution; 0 otherwise.
Definition 3: Risk
Given a total initial risk T IR, a vector S = (S l ), S l ∈ {0, 1}∀ l, 1 ≤ l ≤ k and a matching matrix z li , z li = V i , S l , the risk R is defined as:
Problem: Given a vector of vulnerabilities V , threats T and k security countermeasures, find the vector S, which minimises total investment cost and risk.
Multi-objective Optimisation Principles
In most real world scenarios problems can be formulated to satisfy single or multiple objectives and a decision choice is made based on these objectives and constraints. However, these objectives and constraints are conflicting each other in many cases, making it difficult to find an optimal solution. The to as non-dominated frontier or a Pareto front [25] .
The concept of dominance plays a crucial role for our problem, i.e., minimisation of the security countermeasure cost and risk. A solution that reduces risk will most probably increase cost and vice versa. However, the Pareto front of our problem will provide the optimal trade-offs.
Generating a Pareto set can be computationally expensive, though, a number of stochastic search methods such as evolutionary algorithms, tabu search, simulated annealing have been developed. In general, these methods do not guarantee the optimality of the solution but they often find good approximate solutions. As evolutionary algorithms posses several characteristics that are desired for the multi-objective problems involving multiple conflicting objectives, and intractably large and complex search spaces, these types of search strategies have been successfully used for more than a decade [25] .
Multi-objective Tabu Search (MOTS) for Risk Optimisation
We develop a Tabu Search (TS) technique for solving (8) . TS has been applied to a wide range of combinatorial optimisation (e.g. scheduling, routing, traveling salesman) problems. We are now willing to test its the efficiency in the security countermeasure selection problem. The elements, parameters and operation that have been used in our algorithm are presented as following:
• Solution S.
A solution is a selection of countermeasures.
• Initial random solution S rnd .
The multi-objective TS (MOTS) algorithm starts from creating an initial solution, which is randomly selected, i.e., each element S l of solution S is set to 0 or 1 with an equal probability.
• The solution space X. This is the set of all possible solutions. The size of X is 2 l , where l is the number of available countermeasures.
• Objective function f p ( S),
The objective function f p ( S) is used to evaluate solution S with respect to the objective p. In this case, there are two objective functions, (6) and (7) .
• Neighbourhood N s .
The TS moves at each iteration from current solution S to a neighbouring one S ′ based on a tabu selection process.
• Tabu List (tb).
The concept of the tabu list is introduced to prevent the problem of possible cycling or/and infinite loop [26] . Tabu list does not allow solutions that have been visited recently.
• Aspiration criteria.
The aspiration criteria is a global rule for allowing a move, even if it is tabu, if it is a non-dominated solution [27] .
• Stopping criteria. TS stops iterating when a given condition is reached.
The condition could be a given number of iterations, a running time or a solution quality. First of all, in each iteration the neighboorhood N s of a current solution S must be defined. In our case, we limit the number of visited neighboors to a value N s . Thus, MOTS moves from current solution S to its best neighbooring one (with the lowest cost and/or risk within the neighboorhood)
S ′ ∈ N s . To construct the Pareto frontier, we remove dominated solutions.
The dominated solutions are those, which satisfy the following constraints:
• If the objective function value for cost f c ( S) is no greater than the corresponding or is equal to cost function value of the neighboor, that is: that is, f c ( S) ≤ f c ( S ′ ) and the objective function value for risk f r ( S) is strictly less than the corresponding risk function value of the neighboor: that is, f r ( S) < f r ( S ′ );
• If the objective function value for cost f c ( S) is no greater than the corresponding cost function value of the neighboor, that is: that is, It must be noted, that the objective function f ( S ′ ) of the best neighbor does not need to improve the current one f ( S). To avoid getting stuck in a local minima, MOTS may move from current solution S to a neighbooring 22 one S ′ even it is worsening the objective function value [26] . The action of this move from current solution S to its best neighboor S ′ is called movement [28] . MOTS stops iterating when a given condition is reached, i.e., given number of iterations. The pseudo code of the MOTS is given in Algorithm 1.
Experiments and Discussion
In the following section, we demonstrate the validity of the proposed model by applying an optimisation routine to help decision makers to decide the best solution in multi-objective terms. We compare the qualities of MOTS solutions to optimal ones obtained through the traditional exhaustive search (ES) approah. We examine ten cases when the number of iterations is changed from 500 iterations to 30 000 iterations to examine the speed of the TS approach in finding near optimal solutions.
Prior to presenting actual results, it is appropriate to note that the solving method was written in C++ and executed on an AMD Athlon II X2 245 2.8MHZ processor, 4GB RAM.
Testing the speed of MOTS
For the first experiment, we test the speed of the MOTS for the original problem. Increasing the number of iterations, we have recorded the time. Table 7 summarizes the efficiency of the MOTS recorded at each case.
The next step of the first experiment was to analyse the quality of solutions obtained. Figure 3(a) shows the non-dominated solutions obtained in 500, 2500, 8000 and 20000 iterations.
In comparison, we took 8000 and 20 000 iteration generated solutions.
We did not observe any significant change in the non-dominated solutions Pareto front with good trade-offs between both objectives.
Despite the fact, that ES is the only algorithm that has an ability to obtain optimal solutions for multi-objective problems, the downside of ES is that the search is computationally expensive. To justify the fact that MOTS has found near optimal solutions, we have calculated Euclidean distance between solutions obtained by both algorithms. Figure 5 shows how close these 54 solutions obtained by MOTS were to the optimum one obtained by ES. It was recorded that 31 solution obtained by MOTS was exactly the same as the ones obtained by ES, thus we can say that MOTS has obtained 30% of optimal solutions when the stopping condition was set to 8000 iterations (Table 9 ). Other solutions though, are very close to optimum ones, as it can be seen in Figure 5 .
Testing MOTS for the different problem
For the third experiment, we have modified the problem by varying the likelihood L ij , impact I i , cost C l and matching z li values. In terms of speed, Table 9 .
From the experiment, we can claim, that in the intervals of 5000 -10000 iterations the decision maker can obtain higher percentage of optimal solutions (∼ 30%). However, when time is considered as a stopping condition, the best results would be achieved when the algorithm runs between 95s - 
Conclusion
The importance of decision making in the area of computer security is well understood. Large body of work has been undertaken to support decision makers by providing models which deal with the optimisation of financial investments in relation to computer security. However, most of the models described in existing study are hypothetical rather than practical.
This paper has proposed a novel risk assessment and optimisation model (RAOM), which is partially based on NIST SP800-30 guidelines on performing risk assessments in various organisations. We have adopted the step-by-step procedure of assessing risk, however, we made some important modifications in calculating impact of vulnerabilities and total risk. Due to the fact, that computer security is referred to as CIA, we have designed a way of defining risk in relation to an impact on CIA that each identified vulnerability introduces.
The RAOM differs from previous attempts on improving computer security by applying optimisation techniques in several ways. First of all the RAOM seeks to assess risk considering an impact on CIA and likelihood that possible threats will exploit identified vulnerabilities, whereas most recent methodologies exclude this realistic fact and risk is assumed to be uniform (e.g. [12] ). Moreover, RAOM has an advantage that applying a Tabu Search method to solve a multi-objective countermeasure selection problem formulated in this study makes it possible to review the solutions with the good balance between the two objectives: risk and cost.
Overall it can be concluded that RAOM contributes a new way to make decisions more justified and informed. Experimental results showed that MOTS approach is much faster than the ES approach in searching for the Pareto optimal set. Moreover, the proposed MOTS algorithm showed a good approximation of solutions if compared with the optimal solutions obtained by the ES.
Despite the advantages RAOM and MOTS provides for decision makers, larger size problems (e.g. when the size of security controls, threats and vulnerabilities increases) have not been tested yet. A future research task will thus be to test the performance and scalability of the proposed approach and compare it with other heuristics. Furthermore, we would be interested in adding constraints to the problem, such as a maximum budget assigned for security countermeasure implementation and/or the bounds of risk an organisation is willing to take.
